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• Ambitious project
• It provides a quantitative characterization of optimal
intergenerational risk sharing in a world in which almost
everything is random (productivity, demography, longevity), and
in which investment is the engine of long-run growth (Ak
model).
• This is done in a log-linear framework. Hence it is possible to
understand precisely the role of preferences and technology on
the shape of the optimal policy mix.
• A tour de force, indeed.
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• Of course, one can always wonder whether it makes sense to
characterize in such details the optimal intergenerational
redistribution while neglecting the very real possibility that
public schemes simply crowd out, or substitute for, voluntary
redistribution within the family.
• This does not necessarily plead for jettisoning OLG in favor of
Ricardian models. Instead, this argues for thinking howmuch
risk sharing would take place privately if agents lived, say, for
three periods.
• A lot of the macroeconomic risk could be shared, without public
intervention, between the newly born and the middle-aged.
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• Scope for public intervention limited to risk-sharing with the
unborn, net of the risk they can diversify after they are born.
• Is it a lot? Is it mainly intergenerational?
• Conjecture: the risks of being born female or male, healthy or
handicapped, from poor or rich parents dwarf the risk of being
born in a recession. And indeed, most PAYG systems incorporate
redistributive features to pool some of these risks within cohort.
• But these are very general points.
• Let’s play the game according to the rules set by the paper!
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• Relative to Bohn: deal with risk aversion and intertemporal
substitution separately. But Bohn already examines the effect of
age-dependent risk aversion, and of labor-leisure choices.
• Relative to Krueger and Kubler: go beyond PAYG system, and
compute optimal mix between defined benefits and defined
contributions, and funded/unfunded systems.
• Relative to Barbie, Hagedorn and Kaul: talk about ex ante
efficiency. This is similar to Bohn. See below for interim
efficiency.
• Relative to all: AK model. Hence feedback from work effort from
young onto capital accumulation and long-run growth.
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In an ex ante optimal allocation:
. Consumption of young and old move together.
. The old bear a larger share of macro risk than the young if they
are relatively more risk averse.
. Permanent aging of the population requires lower total
consumption of the old (and more work by the young, in order
to increase savings, and thus growth, in this AK model).
• Results  and  are not surprising: standard results from the
theory of efficient risk sharing.
• Result  is semi-intuitive. But see later about formalization of
longevity.
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• Competitive equilibria in OLGmodels are usually not ex ante
Pareto efficient.
• One exception: log utility, full capital depreciation (Blanchard
and Weil, , ; Bohn, )
• This special case is not generic, yet it reveals the main features of
Pareto optimal allocations.
• I borrow heavily from Blanchard and Weil ().
Example: log utility, full depreciation
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• Generation t maximizes (1−β) lnC1,t +β lnC2,t+1 subject to
C1,t +St =Wt ,
C2,t+1 = Rt+1St .
• Optimal consumption of young and old at t (different
generations!) is:
C1,t =βWt , C2,t = RtβWt−1.
• Hence
C2,t
C1,t
=
Rt Wt−1
Wt
.
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• With Cobb-Douglas production, full depreciation, inelastic labor
supply and constant population (Nt = 1), market clearing
requires
Kt+1 = St =βWt =β(1−α)At K
α
t .
• But since Rt =αAt K
α−1
t , this can be shown to imply that
Rt Wt−1
Wt
=
α
(1−α)β
≡ θ.
• Therefore:
C2,t
C1,t
=
Rt Wt−1
Wt
= θ.
Hence consumption of young and old are perfectly correlated.
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C2,t
C1,t
=
Rt Wt−1
Wt
= θ.
• One can show that, in this economy, the unconditional
expectation of the logarithm of the gross marginal product of
capital is lnθ.
• Zilcha has shown that, in this example without population
growth, Elnθ > 0, i.e, θ > 1, entails dynamic efficiency.
• It then also entails ex ante Pareto optimality, since the
competitive allocation can then be shown to solve
Et
∞∑
s=0
(1+θ)−s[(1−β) lnC1,t+s +β lnC2,t+s+1)].
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• Unfortunately requires hard work.
• I suspect that the adoption of an Ak model precludes the need
for a discussion of issues related to dynamic efficiency which
otherwise arise naturally in these OLGmodels (e.g., Bohn, ).
• It stands to reason that optimality requires that consumption of
young and old move together (result ).
• The optimal theory of risk bearing also requires, obviously, that
the less risk averse bear more risk (result ).
• What about longevity?
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• Fascinating issue arises in the paper as to the preference for
longevity.
• Suppose I have 1 unit of good to spend, and that I can choose to
eat it all now and die right afterward, or to eat / of it now and
/ of it tomorrow (ignore impatience and discounting).
• The former strategy yields utility q(1), the latter 2q(1/2).
• Hence it is optimal to live fast and furious rather than slow and
easy iff q(1)> 2q(1/2), or more generally if the derivative of
ωq(1/ω) with respect to ω is negative.
• To make sure this does not occur,the authors impose the
restriction q(z)− zq ′(z) > 0 for all z.
• Strange restriction, as it rules out, for instance log utility and
anything more concave than log.
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• In the paper, the old don’t value leisure. So nothing pathological
in sometimes wanting to live fast and furious. Assume indeed,
contrary to the paper, that q(1)>2q(1/2).
• Now suppose that living longer is in itself pleasurable. Call λ the
utility value of an extra period of time (net of the extra hours
spent in the gym to increase longevity).
• Then living fast and furious provides utility q(1)+λ, slow and
easy 2q(1/2)+2λ. Thus slow and easy is optimal if
λ> q(1)−2q(1/2)> 0.
• So what’s missing from the paper is a more careful consideration
of the costs and benefits of longevity.
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• Epigraph of The Economic Theory of Suicide by Hamermesh and
Soss (JPE ):
...as soon as the terrors of life reach the point at
which they outweigh the terrors of death, a man will put
an end to his life. [Schopenhauer, On Suicide]
• So it’s indeed crucial to think comprehensively about costs and
benefits when talking about endogenous longevity.
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If we take endogenous growth seriously, we should be willing to
entertain the possibility that the conversion from PAYG to
fully-funded might be painless, or less painless than one may think.
• Positive impact of growth on R from conversion might be
stronger than negative wealth effect (young contribute but don’t
receive anything in exchange).
• Does nos occur in Ak , but could in other growth models.
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Barbie & al., together with many other others, focus on interim
efficiency. Why?
• Under interim efficiency, agents born in different states are
treated as distinct. I.e., interim efficiency removes the Rawlsian
veil of ignorance of ex ante efficiency.
• Interim efficiency leaves a place for efficiency improvements
beyond the elimination of dynamic inefficiency.
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• Crucially, interim optimal allocations can be implemented by
sophisticated, state-contingent, Ponzi schemes in which agents
take part voluntarily [Blanchard & Weil, , ; Barbie & al.,
].
• By contrast, the transfers required by the more demanding ex
ante efficiency concepts are in most cases not implementable in a
democracy: there is not guarantee (in contrast with interim
efficiency) that the next generation will respect the social
intergenerational insurance contract.
In sum, the debate about ex ante v. interim efficiency is not an
“academic”debate: it is a policy debate.
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• The authors conclude by expressing concern about the “political
risk” stemming for governments facing “serious problems of
committing future generations to an [ex ante] optimal
risk-sharing contract.”
• Bohn (), who also adopts an ex ante efficiency criterion, is
puzzled that “fiscal institutions seem designed... to provide
relatively safe transfers to retirees”and suspects that “economists
who trust OGmodels will tend to find [the results of his paper]
supportive of policy reforms that impose more risk on retirees.”
• The solution to this conundrummight be to adopt instead the
interim optimality criterion.
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• Ambitious and very paper
• Intuitive results
• The beauty is that, despite all the ingredients (almost a Lucasian
“orgy of bells and whistles”), it remains tractable, which is a real
feat.
• Doubts, however, about the appropriateness of the ex ante
efficiency criterion
